There are two questions with multiple answers regarding the relationship between Africa and the International
Introduction
There is a general perception in Africa that the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC or Court)1 is targeting the continent while ignoring crimes committed on other continents.2 The African Union (AU) has decided not to cooperate with the ICC in the arrest and surrender of President Al-Bashir of Sudan and even contemplated a mass withdrawal from the ICC by African States Parties to the Rome treaty, thereby threatening the existence of the ICC.3 During the summit of heads of states and governments in May 2013, the AU issued a resolution stating that there is a 'need for international justice to be conducted in a transparent and fair manner, in order to avoid any perception of double standard, in conformity with the principles of international law.'4 Regarding the cases in Kenya, the AU stated that the indictments pose a threat to 'on-going efforts in the promotion of peace, national healing and reconcili-ation, as well as the rule of law and stability, not only in Kenya, but also in the Region.'5 Despite Botswana's reservation on the adoption of the decision, it confirms the sentiments of several African leaders concerning the involvement of the ICC in Africa. As at February 2014, 21 cases in eight situations have been brought before the ICC and all of them are from the African continent.6 Meanwhile, 122 states parties have ratified the Rome Statute.7 The preponderance of African cases under investigation deserves further attention. If the AU's contestation with the ICC is based only on the geographical location of the situations and cases, then the AU's assertions can be said to be correct, as there is currently no other continent with a docket before the ICC. However, the AU has specifically accused the office of the Prosecutor of targeting Africa.8 For example, the former Chairperson of the AU, Jean Ping argues that Africa is not against the ICC but against the former prosecutor who is accused of employing double standards.9 The election of the new Prosecutor, who is African, has not improved the relationship between the two institutions.10 The AU has stated that indictments of African leaders are aimed at destabilising the continent.11 The AU further argues that the request by the ICC to arrest and surrender President Al-Bashir is a contravention of Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute.12 These developments expose the ICC to different kinds of problems. They raise issues of independence regarding the activities of the Prosecutor and the legitimacy of the Court in the manner proceedings are carried out. It does not seem as if Africa entirely rejects the ICC. However, it seems that the prosecutorial choices made by the former prosecutor may have been responsible for the AU's opposition to the activities of the ICC in Africa. In addition, it should be noted that the major cause of contention between the ICC and the AU is the arrest warrant issued against the President of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir as a result of UNSC referral and which is consistent with the provisions of the Statute. This paper discusses the relationship between the ICC, the UNSC and the AU. It articulates the roles for the each of the three institutions in the maintenance of international peace and security and is divided into six parts. Part two discusses the tensions between the three institutions and how they can work together. The relationship between the ICC and the UNSC is evaluated in part three noting the powers of the UNSC to refer matters to the ICC and also defer matters currently before the ICC. Part four appraises the relationship between the ICC and the AU and argues for the effective implementation of the principle of positive complementarity in the activities of the prosecutor of the ICC. Part five discusses how to build a credible partnership between the ICC and the AU. Part six is the conclusion. The paper makes three distinct arguments. The first is a recommendation for a division of labour between the ICC and the UNSC. As will be seen below, the power of the UNSC to refer situations to the ICC and defer cases before the Court is a primary source of the disagreement between the prosecutor and the AU. Second, the paper argues that the principle of complementarity should be applied to regional organisations and in this instance, the AU. Third, the relationship between the AU and negatively impact on the political, social and economic development of States and their ability to conduct international relations.'; See also T. Hansen, 'Africa and the International Criminal Court' , in T. Murithi clearly politicizes the activities of the Court. As commentators have argued, "the role assigned to the UNSC cast shadows on the credibility of the ICC as an independent Court of Law."18 In addition, the power of the UNSC to refer matters to the ICC and also defer matters currently before the ICC gives the UNSC indirect control over the activities of the Court. It has been argued that the deferral power of the UNSC in Article 16 of the Rome Statute is "a heavy sacrifice for the power and independence of the Court."19
2.1
Referral of Cases to the ICC The UNSC is empowered by the Rome Statute to trigger the jurisdiction of the Court when crimes within the jurisdiction of the court have been committed in the territory of both states parties and non-states parties to the treaty.20 The UNSC has made use of this provision in the cases in Sudan and Libya which were referred to the ICC pursuant to the Chapter VII powers of the UNSC. However, the referral of Darfur conflict in Sudan has raised several issues regarding the immunity of Heads of State and Government and the blanket amnesty provided by UNSC for UN personnel in Sudan.21 Furthermore, the US has also used resolutions 1422 (2002) and 1487 (2003) of the UNSC to extend immunity from ICC prosecution to peace-keepers that are from non-States Parties to the Rome Statute and threatened to veto the extension of UN peace-keeping mandates if the resolutions granting US citizens immunity were not adopted. Article 16 of the Statute grants the UNSC the power to defer cases before the ICC. The power of the UNSC to defer cases before the ICC is not limited by the process through which the cases were referred to the Court. In deferring cases, the UNSC acts under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which means that there has to be evidence that there is a threat to international peace and security. Article 16 complements Article 17 which deals with issues of admissibility and Article 53 which addresses investigation and prosecution of international crimes. It has been suggested that while the OTP focuses on investigating and prosecuting international crimes, it is the responsibility of the UNSC as a political body to determine when an investigation and prosecution will not serve the interests of justice under Article 16.31 This means that if a decision on deferral is to be made, the proper channel is through the UNSC which is a political body with the mandate to maintain international peace and security.32 While this proposition has merit, it is important to note that though the UNSC has the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, it does not have an exclusive responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security in respect to the activities of the ICC.33 Furthermore, Article 53 of the Statute confers on the prosecutor the power to discontinue cases before the ICC and that responsibility should complement the powers of the UNSC. Recent developments before the Court make it imperative to recon- sider the role of the UNSC in maintaining international peace and security and its impact on the activities of the ICC. The UNSC referred cases in Sudan and Libya to the Court.34
In UNSC resolution 1970, Libya was referred to the ICC.35 The UNSC argues that 'the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity' .36 In making the decision to refer the matter to the ICC, the UNSC reiterated the fact that the investigations and prosecution could be delayed by one year if a resolution is adopted to that effect.37 Furthermore, the resolution was unequivocal in relation to the jurisdiction for crimes that may be committed in Libya by nationals that are not States Parties to the Rome Statute while enforcing the UNSC resolution.38 The involvement of the UNSC in the activities of the ICC has had mixed results. The powers of the UNSC under the UN Charter are positive responses to threats to international peace and security. However, the political nature and composition of the UNSC has resulted in its actions and decisions coming under scrutiny and criticisms.39 The relationship between the ICC and the UNSC has affected AU's policy towards the ICC because of the possibility of the UNSC to refer non-state parties of the Statute to the ICC. will show that though they are different and distinct in ideology and practice, a common thread binds them. The ICC, the UN and the AU are international organisations. According to the International Law Commission, an international organization is an "organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality."40 In addition, they are committed to the maintenance of international peace and security. For instance, the ICC preamble recognizes that international crimes "threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world".41 The ICC is an independent permanent court in relationship with the UN and has jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.42 On the other hand, the UN Charter states that the UNSC has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security", although the UN Charter does not preclude the existence of regional organisations dealing with issues of international peace and security as long as their activities do not contradict that of the UNSC.43 When there is a threat to international peace and security on the African continent, the Constitutive Act of the AU provides that the regional body can intervene in the affairs of a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government in respect of grave circumstances, including war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.44 Member states of the AU can also request intervention from the AU in order to restore peace and security.45 From the foregoing, it does seem these organisations share similar mandates when it comes to threats to international peace and security. However, the reality is that the AU currently opposes some of the activities of the ICC in Africa. Although beyond the discussions in this paper, the AU's opposition to the intervention of the ICC in Africa raises pertinent questions regarding the relationship between Africa and Western countries.46 One major contention 40 Article 2 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 2011. This definition was adopted by the International Law Commission at its sixty-third session, in 2011, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission's report covering the work of that session (A/66/10, para. 87). 41
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The relationship between Africa and international law is currently debated by scholars and views are polarized. Africa and Third World's role in international law is subject to different interpretations and several theories leading to the evolution of scholars whose thoughts and ideas have crystalized into what is loosely known as 'Third World between the ICC and the AU is the involvement of the activities of the UNSC in the affairs of the ICC to the detriment of the African continent in the referral of cases to the ICC. This article therefore advances the argument that the decision to suspend or defer investigations or prosecutions in the "interests of justice" under Article 53 of the Rome Statute should be a shared responsibility between the ICC and the UNSC. This will involve the UNSC handling issues that emanate from its referrals using Article 16 of the Rome Statute while the prosecutor concentrates on cases arising from States Party referrals or the Prosecutor's proprio motu powers. This will conform to the argument by the prosecutor that the 'interests of peace' are political in nature and therefore beyond the mandate of the office. However, this is not to argue that cases referred by States Parties and those opened by the Prosecutor do not pose threats to international peace and security. But cases referred by the UNSC to the ICC are specifically referred because they relate to threats to international peace and security. Therefore, it should be the Security Council who considers referrals in these cases. Such a division of labour between the UNSC and the prosecutor in considering the deferral of cases will ensure that the checks and balances provided by the Rome Statute are used to its optimum and to avoid the UNSC exerting undue influence over the activities of the ICC.
The Relationship between the AU and the ICC
The ICC, as a judicial institution is concerned mainly with the investigation and prosecution of international crimes set out in the Rome Statute. The ICC is a creation of treaty law and is distinct from the UN and related bodies. The Rome Statute provides for a relationship agreement between the ICC and the UN which would map how the two should cooperate and complement each has not been signed due to the current, problematic relationship between the ICC and the AU.49 As previously argued, a closer look at the principles and objectives of the AU in relation to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa and the preamble of the Statute suggests that there should be synergy between the two institutions. While the ICC has the jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute individuals for international crimes, the AU has a broad mandate to maintain peace and security while promoting and protecting human rights and democracy on the African continent. In making a determination whether to investigate and prosecute crimes, Article 17 of the Statute requires that the prosecutor assess whether the case is admissible before the Court by assessing the activities of national governments to investigate or prosecute the relevant crimes. However, the Statute does not clearly provide for such a complementary relationship between the ICC and regional organisations except in relation to cooperation issues. There are several reasons why cooperation between the ICC and the AU is vital for the effective prosecution of international crimes on the continent. As earlier noted, the majority of the cases currently before the ICC are from Africa. Furthermore, cooperation between the ICC and intergovernmental organisations is provided for in the treaty. For example, the Rome Statute provides that '[t]he Court may ask any intergovernmental organisation to provide information or documents. The Court may also ask for other forms of cooperation and assistance which may be agreed upon with such an organisation and which are in accordance with its competence or mandate.50 In terms of a relationship between the prosecutor and a regional organisation, the Rome Statute further provides that the prosecutor shall seek the cooperation of any state or intergovernmental or arrangement in accordance with its respective The application of positive complementarity in the relationship between the ICC and the AU is vital for the effective functioning of the ICC. This is because the ICC will have the opportunity to encourage national judicial systems to carry out investigations and prosecutions of international crimes. The support and assistance of the AU in this regard through a relationship agreement will be vital. basis of three cardinal principles: the idea of a shared burden of responsibility, the management of effective investigations and prosecutions, and the two pronged nature of the cooperation regime.57 It is also defined as a process by which the prosecutor "would actively encourage investigation and prosecution of international crimes within the court's jurisdiction by States where there is reason to believe that such States may be able or willing to undertake genuine investigations and prosecutions and where the active encouragement of national proceedings offers a resource-effective means of ending impunity."58 The complementarity principle of the Rome Statute applies to the relationship between States Parties to the Rome Statute and national governments. However, it is argued that the application of positive complementarity should not be limited only to the relationship between the ICC and national domestic legal systems. Activities carried out by regional and international organisations with the support of the ICC to combat impunity should be regarded as a positive contribution to preventing international crimes. An example of the application of positive complementarity is UNSC resolution 1593 that referred the Darfur conflict to the ICC. The resolution '[i]nvites the Court and the [AU] to discuss practical arrangements that will facilitate the work of the Prosecutor and of the Court, including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, which would contribute to regional efforts in the fight against impunity' .59 The possibility of conducting proceedings in the region can be given three different interpretations. The first interpretation is that the AU should facilitate the work of the ICC in the investigation and prosecution of international crimes in Africa. This can be achieved using a relationship or through a memorandum of understanding.60 The second interpretation is that the AU can carry out investigations and prosecutions of international crimes in Sudan in collaboration with the ICC. The third interpretation is that the ICC and the AU can work out modalities of carrying out in situ trials on the continent.
The UNSC referred the Darfur conflict to the ICC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UN Charter provides that any action required in carrying out the decisions of the UNSC for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the members of the UN or by some of them, as the UNSC may determine.61 Furthermore, decisions by the UNSC to deal with threats to international peace and security shall be carried out by the members of the UN directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.62 In the Darfur situation, the AU is singled out in the resolution as the regional organisation to complement the efforts of the ICC and the UNSC in the fight against impunity in Sudan. The resolution encourages the ICC to support international cooperation with domestic efforts to promote the rule of law, protect human rights and combat impunity in Darfur.63 Furthermore, in relation to the interests of justice, the UNSC resolution 1593 contemplates alternative justice mechanisms to complement criminal prosecutions in the resolution of the Darfur conflict. For example, the resolution:
[E]mphasizes the need to promote healing and reconciliation and encourages in this respect the creation of institutions, involving all sectors of Sudanese society, such as truth and/or reconciliation commissions, in order to complement judicial processes and thereby reinforce the efforts to restore long-lasting peace, with [AU] and international support as necessary.64
The UNSC effectively confirmed the indispensable role of the AU in the resolution of the Darfur conflict. The legal significance of a UNSC resolution on the ICC is that the Court has an obligation to carry out the provisions of the resolution and even report back to the UNSC on how the resolution has been carried out. For example, the relationship agreement between the UN and ICC states:
When the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides to refer to the Prosecutor pursuant to and Evidence. Such information shall be transmitted through the Secretary-General.65
As the UNSC has the power to refer cases to the ICC and defer matters before the ICC, it means that any decision taken by the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter carries weight.. It also means that ignoring the AU may not be in the interest of the ICC in the investigation and prosecution of international crimes as the complementary roles envisaged by the UNSC will be in jeopardy.
4.2
The Policy of Non-Cooperation with the ICC The AU has officially endorsed a policy of non-cooperation with the ICC in the arrest and surrender of President Al-Bashir of Sudan, arguing that this decision is consistent with Article 98 (1) Given the slow pace of ratification, it is unlikely that the protocol will come into force anytime soon. In other words, the claim that it is going to be used to provide impunity in Africa may be exaggerated. However, the recent decision to extend immunity to African heads of states is a worrying sign and a clear of picture of the tensions surrounding the project.88
The ICC and Criminal Chamber of the African Union
The envisioned African criminal chamber faces several challenges. These include the hurried nature of the drafting process, personnel issues, its relationship with the ICC and crimes under the jurisdiction of the proposed criminal chamber.89 For example, not all the crimes under the jurisdiction of the proposed criminal chamber are international crimes.90 Supporters of the criminal chamber have acknowledged that all the crimes in the draft protocol are not international crimes, but argue that these crimes threaten peace and security in the African continent necessitating the current move to criminalize them.91 Furthermore, the UN and the AU have adopted several instruments in relation to all the crimes under the jurisdiction of the criminal chamber.92 Whether these efforts will meet the jurisdictional threshold set out in the Rome Statute under the principle of complementarity is one that has to be decided by the judges of the ICC when the issue comes up before them.93
Though the ICC does not explicitly envisage a regional court in terms of complementarity, there is no provision in the Statute that discourages the establishment of regional accountability mechanisms to fight impunity on 88 In 98 The prosecutor, defendants or victims of crimes under consideration by the ICC can request a relocation of the seat of the Court from The Hague on a temporary basis.99 UNSC resolution 1593 provides that the ICC and the AU should 'discuss practical arrangements that will facilitate the work of the Prosecutor and of the Court, including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, which would contribute to regional efforts in the fight against impunity' .100 This means that the ICC can sit on the continent to hear cases and also cooperate with the AU regarding cases before it.
There is no provision in the Rome Statute that prohibits such an undertaking. Having the ICC sit temporarily in Africa will help the court reach out to victims and witnesses, including the ICC's critics. 101 Regarding possible venues that can be used for the proceedings, the Court can enter into negotiations with the UN and the governments of Tanzania or Sierra Leone regarding the facilities of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) or the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). The countries where the crimes were committed can also be considered. The Statute encourages the ICC to enter into different forms of cooperation and assistance from intergovernmental organisations. Kenyan situation inside Kenya or Arusha, Tanzania.104 The judges of the ICC did not reach the required two-third majority needed for the decision in the case involving William Ruto and Joshua Sang.105 However, the fact that ICC judges considered the issue seems to indicate a possibility for in situ trials in the future. 106 The AU is encouraged to cooperate with the ICC notwithstanding the current face-off as the venues suggested above are not facilities of the AU. One disadvantage of having an ICC Chamber sitting in Africa may be the issue of security and threat to witnesses. For example, ICC personnel citing security issues may decide not to relocate to Africa for proceedings in the region. 107 This was the case when the Pre-Trial Chamber II mooted the idea of holding confirmation of charges hearings in Kenya. 108 The prosecutor opposed the idea citing security concerns in Kenya.109 It will be recalled that the SCSL had to relocate to The Hague due to perceived security concerns of holding Charles Taylor's trial in Sierra Leone.110
5.2
Mixed Chamber of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights Another possible scenario is a mixed chamber of African and international judges in the proposed criminal Chamber of the ACJHPR. This will enhance the legitimacy and objectivity of the criminal chamber. The possibility of this proposal should be explored as it will enable the ACJHPR to assert its independence and impartiality in relation to international criminal prosecutions. Furthermore, resolution 1593 can be interpreted as supporting the AU in setting up a mixed chamber of the ACJHPR to adjudicate international crimes.111 The draft protocol amending the merger protocol provides;
The Court shall be composed of impartial and independent Judges elected from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are juris-consults of recognized competence and experience in international law, international human rights law, international humanitarian law or international criminal law.112
This can be interpreted as not precluding the AU from appointing non-Africans to the ACJHPR. This means that AU member states nominating candidates may be allowed to nominate non-citizens into the chambers of the African Court. Allowing international judges to sit in the criminal chamber in Africa is not a new idea. The SCSL has a mixed chamber comprising of local and 
5.3
Liaison Office of the ICC at the AU The need to have an ICC liaison office at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa cannot be over emphasized. It will serve as an opportunity for the two institutions to develop synergies of cooperation and mutual assistance. 115 The reason for the refusal to grant the request of the ICC to open a liaison office with the AU is attributed to the refusal of the UNSC to defer the cases in Sudan and Kenya using Article 16 of the Statute. However, the decision is not that of the ICC but the UNSC. The AU's decision to suspend the establishment of a liaison office due to the inability of the UNSC to act on a request for deferral should be revisited. The AU should have ways of communicating its displeasure with the UNSC directly. The liaison office affords the AU and the ICC an opportunity to engage in constant consultation and dialogue based on mutual trust.116 It could also permit the victims of crimes within the Statute to receive necessary support and assistance while integrating victims' issues in the activities of the AU. This will require a review of the current mode of operation of the AU in promoting peace and security in the region.
AU member states that are parties to the Statute would benefit from regular updates on issues related to their membership of the ICC and such an official channel in Addis Ababa may prove helpful. The good news is that the AU Summit resolution '[d]ecide[d] to reject for now' the possibility of opening an ICC liaison office at Addis Ababa. This means that the AU is still open to further discussions on this issue.117 It will be a good opportunity for the AU and the ICC to have regular briefings and discussions regarding developments on the investigation and prosecution of international crimes in the continent and the opening of the liaison office will be a good way to start the relationship.
5.4
Relationship Agreement between the AU and the ICC As already noted, the ICC currently has relationship agreements with several inter-governmental organisations including the UN and the EU. These agreements aid the ICC in the administration of international justice. The Statute provides for the Court to enter into bilateral agreements that will enhance its work. The AU and the ICC had commenced work on the relationship agreement before the current lull caused by the indictment of President Al-Bashir of Sudan. Human Rights Watch has argued that the relationship agreement should be revisited by the AU and the ICC.118 This is because the process of dialogue between the ICC and the AU required to negotiate the terms of the relationship agreement will help clarify thorny issues that are currently affecting the relationship between the two institutions.119 Some African states parties to the Rome Statute, including situation countries, have signed the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities (APIC) to ensure that the Court effectively carries out its mandate to investigate and prosecute those responsible for international crimes.120 The AU should follow suit and ensure that the relationship agreement is completed to enable effective cooperation between the two institutions.
Conclusion
Though the relationship between the UN and the ICC is clearly defined, the role of the UNSC in the activities of the ICC has been a cause for concern since the entry into force of the Rome Statute. Because the primary responsibility of the UNSC is to maintain international peace and security, Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides the UNSC the power to defer proceedings before the ICC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The deferral of proceedings should be limited to UNSC referrals to ensure that the ICC does not become involved with politically charged situations occasioned by the democracy deficit of the UNSC.
Regarding the relationship between the ICC and AU, it is obvious that the faceoff is causing serious credibility problems for the ICC and has to be managed carefully to avoid the sentiments that the Court is established solely to prosecute Africans. The ICC's response should not be restricted to investigating other continents, but must involve the review of its prosecutorial policies to recognise the tension between peace and justice and the potential use of Article 53 to defer proceedings before the ICC that were referred by States Parties and through the proprio motu power of the prosecutor. The ICC should also review its prosecutorial policies that limit the role of positive complementarity in the activities of the Court.121
There are on-going agitations for deferral of ICC cases in Sudan, Kenya and Libya spearheaded by the AU. The AU has also commenced the process of establishing a criminal chamber of the ACJHPR to try Africans indicted for international crimes. These activities may be interpreted as the expression of genuine concern by African governments to tackle impunity in the continent or subtle plans to sustain the status quo and ensure that those accused of international crimes are not held accountable. Despite the fact that the proposed amendment of Article 16 of the Rome Statute was not discussed in Kampala due to logistical issues involved, it is imperative for member states of the AU to follow up with the procedure and participate fully in the Working Group on future amendments. This is because the current relationship between the ICC and the UNSC needs to be redefined to ensure the effective functioning of the Court and the AU's input in this regard will be needed.
Finally, there is need for a shared responsibility between the ICC and the AU in the fight against impunity in the continent. This will involve the ICC considering the holding of in situ trials in Africa, while the AU considers the possibility of having international judges in the criminal chamber of the ACJHPR.
The AU and the ICC should further discuss ways of ensuring that the ICC liaison office in Addis Ababa is functional and that the relationship agreement between the ICC and the AU is completed as soon as possible to ensure effective collaboration and synergy in efforts aimed at achieving accountability for international crimes in the continent. Addressing impunity requires the ICC and the AU to see each other as partners and not antagonists. Both institutions should endeavour to develop a credible partnership built on mutual trust and understanding rather the current state of mistrust and suspicion. This is in support of the argument advanced by Max du Plessis that '[t]he fulfilment of the aims and objectives of the ICC on the African continent -in particular through the complementarity regime -are dependent on the support of African states and administrations, the AU and relevant regional organisations, the legal profession, and civil society. Meeting these needs requires commitment to a collaborative relationship between these stakeholders and the ICC.'122
